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ZONING FOR ALL! DISPARATE IMPACT LIABILITY AMIDST 
THE AFFORDABLE HOUSING CRISIS 
Quinn Marker 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The United States has a housing problem. At its most basic and 
unforgiving level, the housing crisis threatens to displace millions of 
Americans each year.1 Millions more teeter on the edge of eviction on a 
near constant basis, plagued by dwindling emergency funds,2 low wages,3 
and rising rents.4 The number of households impacted by this set of 
challenges has risen drastically, with the percentage of cost-burdened 
renters doubling from just under 24% in the 1960s to over 47% in 2016.5 
Times have been particularly challenging for renters, experiencing a 60% 
increase in inflation-adjusted median rent between 1960 and 2016, while 
inflation-adjusted income has grown by merely 5% through the same 
period.6 This culminated in a total of 2.3 million filed evictions in 2016 
alone.7 At the same time, the purchase price of homes has risen faster than 
wages in 80% of U.S. markets, putting home ownership out of reach for 
most Americans.8 While the crisis is most often realized in the form of 
 
 1. In 2016, 2.3 million evictions were filed, resulting in about 900,000 evicted households. 
National Estimates: Eviction in America, EVICTION LAB, PRINCETON UNIV. (May 11, 2018), 
https://evictionlab.org/national-estimates/ [https://perma.cc/ZP85-ZZFP]; see also Terry Gross, First-
Ever Evictions Database Shows: 'We're In the Middle Of A Housing Crisis’, NPR (Apr. 12, 2019, 1:07 
PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/04/12/601783346/first-ever-evictions-database-shows-were-in-the-
middle-of-a-housing-crisis [https://perma.cc/K355-ELMV]. 
 2. Only 61% of U.S. Adults could cover an unexpected $400 expense without going into debt. 
FED. RESERVE, REPORT ON THE ECONOMIC WELL-BEING OF U.S. HOUSEHOLDS IN 2018, 21 (2019), 
 https://www.federalreserve.gov/publications/files/2018-report-economic-well-being-us-households-
201905.pdf [https://perma.cc/M7CC-DXMP]. 
 3. “The real value of the federal minimum wage has dropped 17% since 2009 and 31% since 
1968.” DAVID COOPER ET AL., ECON. POLICY INST., LOW-WAGE WORKERS ARE SUFFERING FROM A 
DECLINE IN THE REAL VALUE OF THE FEDERAL MINIMUM WAGE 2 (2019), 
https://www.epi.org/publication/labor-day-2019-minimum-wage/ 
[https://perma.cc/J3GQ-FLSE]. 
 4. JOINT CTR. FOR HOUS. STUDIES OF HARV. UNIV., THE STATE OF THE NATION’S HOUSING 
2018, 1 (2018), 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/Harvard_JCHS_State_of_the_Nations_Housing_2018.pd
f [https://perma.cc/PM9E-MEE7]. 
 5. Id. at 5. A cost-burdened household spends 30% or more of their income on housing costs. id.; 
see id. at 40 for a table illustrating cost-burdened households among renters and homeowners from 2001-
2016. 
 6. Id. at 5. 
 7. Gross, supra note 1. 
 8. Alcynna Lloyd, Home prices are rising faster than wages in 80% of U.S. markets, 
HOUSINGWIRE (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.housingwire.com/articles/47878-home-prices-are-rising-
faster-than-wages-in-80-of-us-markets [https://perma.cc/P8KQ-J9YQ]. 
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these and other financial conflicts, imposing questions about race, class, 
and health9 are all brought to bear when confronting the crisis head-on. 
The Fair Housing Act’s10 (“FHA” or the “Act”) disparate impact 
liability, formally recognized in Texas Department of Housing & 
Community Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc.,11 can play a 
leading role in solving the issue, particularly in eliminating restrictive 
land use policies across the country. Recent interpretations of Inclusive 
Communities by federal courts have stripped the Act of much of its power 
and threaten to perpetuate the housing crisis. This comment examines the 
state of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act and assesses 
its long-term utility as a tool to combat the housing crisis. Part II first 
examines the impacts of restrictive land use policy before providing a 
brief history of disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act. Part 
II concludes with an overview of notable disparate impact litigation, 
including the landmark case: Texas Department of Housing & Community 
Affairs v. Inclusive Communities Project, Inc. Finally, Part III argues the 
weakened disparate impact liability currently being applied throughout 
several circuit courts, is not in accord with the Fair Housing Act. Part III 
concludes with a proposed burden shifting framework that protects the 
interests of both parties, while fulfilling the stated purpose of the Fair 
Housing Act: “to provide … for fair housing throughout the United 
States.”12  
II. BACKGROUND 
Land use policy controls the way people move throughout their cities. 
It dictates where they work, live, and gather. To be sure, thoughtful 
zoning schemes can, and often do, have merit, but they can also present 
challenges—including economic and racial segregation. This Part first, in 
Section A, presents the impacts of exclusionary zoning and the Supreme 
Court’s treatment of such schemes. Then, Section B presents the Fair 
Housing Act and the origins of disparate impact liability. Next, Section C 
examines the Supreme Court’s interpretation of disparate impact liability 
in the seminal case, Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs 
v. Inclusive Communities Project Inc. Lastly, Section D examines the 
various approaches taken by circuit courts in their application of  
 
 9. Individuals threatened with eviction are more likely to suffer from physical and mental health 
issues, including high blood pressure and depression. See Hugo Vásquez-Vera et al., The threat of home 
eviction and its effects on health through the equity lens: A systematic review, 175 SOC. SCI & MED. 199, 
205 (2017).  
 10. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see also Discriminatory 
Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.5 (LEXIS 2019). 
 11. 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015). 
 12. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
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Inclusive Communities. 
A. The far-reaching impacts of restrictive land use policy 
While local land use policy often goes unnoticed in daily life, 
increasingly restrictive land use policies, such as single-family zoning, 
minimum lot sizes, and other density restrictions, have far-reaching 
negative implications on the housing market for renters, low-income 
individuals, and minorities.13 These policies, particularly single-family 
zoning, contribute to decreased density and lead to “fewer housing 
opportunities for low income and minority residents than those [cities] 
that have embraced a new paradigm for regulating growth and 
development.”14 
Although experts measure the impacts of restrictive land use policy 
differently, most research suggests that density restrictions lead to income 
and racial segregation.15 At a basic level, economists argue density 
restrictions, like minimum lot sizes and single-family zoning, increase 
housing costs by making construction more expensive and constraining 
total supply.16 These restrictions have increased in recent years and can 
be measured by tracking land costs over time.17 Between 2013 and 2016 
the cost of buying land, typically reflected in a comparison between home 
prices and construction costs, increased by nearly 25% compared to the 
average span in the 1990s.18 Likewise, despite only making up 13% of the 
total United States population, African-Americans live, on average, in 
communities that are 46% African-American.19 At the same time, white 
 
 13. See ROLF PENDALL, ROBERT PUENTES, & JONATHAN MARTIN, BROOKINGS INST., FROM 
TRADITIONAL TO REFORMED: A REVIEW OF THE LAND USE REGULATIONS IN THE NATION’S 50 LARGEST 
METROPOLITAN AREAS 5 (2006), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/20060802_Pendall.pdf [https://perma.cc/CKW7-QJ62]. 
 14. Id. at 2. 
 15. Michael C. Lens & Paavo Monkkonen, Do Strict Land Use Regulations Make Metropolitan 
Areas More Segregated by Income?, 82 J. AM. PLAN. ASS‘N 6, 9 (2015), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5800413/ [https://perma.cc/2H9D-NEBH] (“We can 
conclude that density restrictions lead to increased income and racial segregation, but it is less clear how 
other forms of land use regulation affect income segregation.”).  
 16. JOSEPH GYOURKO & RAVEN MOLLOY, HANDBOOK OF REGIONAL AND URBAN ECONOMICS 
1316 (2015), https://faculty.wharton.upenn.edu/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Regulation-and-Housing-
Supply-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/9N9X-6VJG] (“regulation increases the marginal cost of construction, 
both directly through the fees and time costs and indirectly by requiring construction to follow certain 
forms . . . . [S]ome types of regulation such as growth controls effectively make the marginal cost of 
housing infinite by constraining the total number of housing units allowed.”). 
 17. Jason Furman, Opinion, Reform land use, promote shared growth of new housing, S.F. CHRON. 
(Sept. 25, 2016), https://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/Reform-land-use-promote-
shared-growth-of-new-9283703.php [https://perma.cc/BN3B-75GP]. 
 18. Id.  
 19. William H. Frey, Op-Ed, Census Data: Blacks and Hispanics Take Different Segregation 
Paths, BROOKINGS INST. (Dec. 16, 2010), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/census-data-blacks-and-
3
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Americans make up 64% of the population and live in communities that 
are 79% white.20 Even when controlling for socioeconomic factors, 
housing patterns remain largely segregated by race.21  
In response, land use reform has gained traction in recent years. In 
2016, the Obama administration published a toolkit urging local 
governments to adopt modern land use best practices, such as allowing 
accessory dwellings, eliminating parking requirements, and instituting 
multi-family zoning.22 Cities and states across the country, most notably 
Minneapolis and the state of Oregon, answered the call and eliminated 
exclusionary zoning.23 Many others are poised to follow suit, sparking 
impassioned cries of the Yes In My Backyard (“YIMBY”) movement to 
counteract the anti-reform Not In My Backyard (“NIMBY”) movement.24  
The Supreme Court is no stranger to exclusionary zoning either. In 
1917, the Court deemed race-based zoning unconstitutional under the 
14th Amendment in Buchannan v. Warley.25 Many cities, particularly in 
the South, defiantly ignored the prohibition and enacted new race based 
zoning codes anyway.26 Following the prohibition of race-based zoning, 
many cities began to employ other forms of facially-neutral exclusionary 
zoning, such as single family zoning, to control where people lived. From 
a YIMBY’s perspective, single-family zoning keeps lower-income 
 
hispanics-take-different-segregation-paths/ [https://perma.cc/X5YR-KJDZ]. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Douglas S. Massey, American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass, 96 
AM. J. SOC. 329, 352 (1990) 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2781105.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad8e47ca6a85d1cface5880ab5c341
430 [https://perma.cc/WF5N-AXPP]. 
 22. THE WHITE HOUSE, HOUSING DEVELOPMENT TOOLKIT 3 (2016), 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/Housing_Development_Toolkit%20f.2.p
df [https://perma.cc/K4UV-3KYR]. 
 23. See Sarah Mervosh, Minneapolis, Tackling Housing Crisis and Inequity, Votes to End Single-
Family Zoning, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/minneapolis-
single-family-zoning.html [https://perma.cc/VH9U-R79Q]; Elliot Njus, Bill to eliminate single-family 
zoning in Oregon neighborhoods passes final legislative hurdle, THE OREGONIAN (June 30, 2019), 
https://www.oregonlive.com/politics/2019/06/bill-to-eliminate-single-family-zoning-in-oregon-
neighborhoods-passes-final-legislative-hurdle.html [https://perma.cc/4ATZ-9EMN]. 
 24. See, e.g., Alexei Koseff, California housing: New laws aim to make it easier to build, S.F. 
CHRON (Oct. 9, 2019),  
 https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/California-housing-New-laws-aim-to-make-
it14504985.php [https://perma.cc/BQ5U-G9JZ] (new legislation includes a five-year moratorium on 
exclusionary zoning and series of bill streamlining the process for accessory dwellings); see also Alana 
Semuels, From ‘Not in My Backyard’ to ‘Yes in My Backyard’, THE ATLANTIC (Jul. 5, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2017/07/yimby-groups-pro-development/532437/ 
[https://perma.cc/J34V-DHMS]. 
 25. 245 U.S. 60 (1917). 
 26. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR 
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA 46-48 (2017). Rothstein describes the post-Buchannan race-based 
zoning codes in Atlanta, Indianapolis, Richmond (VA), Birmingham, West Palm Beach, Austin, Kansas 
City, and Norfolk. Some continued into the late 1980s. 
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families from moving into a more affluent area by blocking more 
affordable multi-family development. From a NIMBY’s perspective, 
single-family zoning is valuable tool to preserve property values and 
neighborhood character. The Supreme Court took the side of the 
NIMBY’s and held single-family zoning constitutional in Village of 
Euclid v. Ambler Realty, noting that zoning regulations should be upheld 
as long as there is some connection to public welfare.27 In so holding, the 
Court characterized multi-family buildings as a “mere parasite, 
constructed in order to take advantage of the open spaces and attractive 
surroundings created by the residential character of the district.”28 One 
year prior to Buchannan, in 1916, just eight cities in the United States had 
zoning codes.29 In 1936, in the wake of Buchannan and Euclid, 1,246 
cities had restrictive zoning codes in place.30 The FHA aimed to confront 
this and other types of discrimination directly. 
Two years after the passage of the Act, exclusionary zoning was again 
recognized as a major problem facing the country when Housing and 
Urban Development (“HUD”) Secretary George Romney introduced his 
Open Communities Plan.31 Romney intended to eliminate exclusionary 
zoning by withholding federal HUD funds from communities whose 
zoning codes did not allow for subsidized multi-family buildings for 
African-American families.32 The pushback was swift and President 
Nixon removed Secretary Romney and his Open Communities Plan 
shortly thereafter.33 In the years following the passage of the Act, with 
discrimination taking on new, covert forms, many courts construed the 
Act broadly in order to implement the Act’s stated purpose: “to provide 
… for fair housing throughout the United States.”34  
 
 27. Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty, 272 U.S. 365, 387-89 (1926). 
 28. Id. at 394. 
 29. Elizabeth Winkler, ‘Snob zoning’ is racial housing segregation by another name, WASH. POST 
(SEPT. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/09/25/snob-zoning-is-racial-
housing-segregation-by-another-name/ [https://perma.cc/BE2Y-69YR]. 
 30. Id.  
 31. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 26 at 201. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91); see generally Trafficante v. 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972) (noting the “broad and inclusive language” of 
the FHA allows parties injured by the “loss of important benefits from interracial associations” to bring a 
claim); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977) (recognizing “that Congress has 
made a strong national commitment to promote integrated housing.”). 
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B. The Fair Housing Act aimed to remedy a century of discrimination 
and racism 
1. Historical Background of the Fair Housing Act 
The roots of housing discrimination run deep.  After the Civil War, the 
Civil Rights Act of 1866 purported to outlaw housing discrimination, but 
the Supreme Court did not officially recognize the prohibition until 
1968.35 In February of the same year the Kerner Commission, in a report 
commissioned by President Lyndon B. Johnson, warned the country was 
“moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and 
unequal.”36 Just seven days after Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated, 
and with National Guard troops on call in the basement of the Capitol,37 
Congress passed the FHA as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.38 
Senator Walter Mondale, one of the bill’s lead sponsors and co-authors, 
characterized it as a means to promote “truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns.”39 The Act’s stated purpose is closely aligned with 
Senator Mondale’s sentiment: “to provide, within constitutional 
limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States.”40 In its current 
form, the Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, 
national origin, sex, familial status, and disability.41  
2. Types of Discrimination Covered Under the Act 
There are two types of discrimination protected under the Act: 
disparate treatment and disparate impact. Disparate treatment requires the 
plaintiff to prove the defendant “had a discriminatory intent or motive.”42 
 
 35. Jones v. Mayer, 392 U.S. 409, 436 (1968) (“In light of the concerns that led Congress to adopt 
[the Civil Rights Act of 1866] and the contents of the debates that preceded its passage, it is clear that the 
Act was designed to do just what its terms suggest: to prohibit all racial discrimination, whether or not 
under color of law, with respect to the rights enumerated therein–including the right to purchase or lease 
property.”) (emphasis added). 
 36. KERNER COMM’N, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CIVIL DISORDERS 
1 (1968) https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/8073NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/53UQ-D7VL]. 
 37. Douglas S. Massey, The Legacy of the 1968 Fair Housing Act, 30 SOC. F. 571, 575 (2015) 
https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/socf.12178 [https://perma.cc/2XSN-723S]. 
 38. Fair Housing Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 81 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 3601-3631 (2012)). 
 39. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale) Mondale further 
added that, “segregated housing is the simple rejection of one human being by another without any 
justification but superior power; we have closed our hearts to our fellow human beings to the extent that 
we have closed our neighborhoods to them.” Id.  
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
 41. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
 42. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 
(2015). 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 88, Iss. 4 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol88/iss4/5
2020] ZONING FOR ALL! 1111 
Disparate treatment discrimination broadly covers discrimination in the 
“sale, rental, or advertising of dwellings, in the provision of brokerage 
services, or in the availability of residential real estate-related 
transactions.”43 HUD regulations identify additional activities considered 
to be disparate treatment discrimination including “blockbusting,”44 
steering,45 and denying membership or participation in any organization 
related to real estate services, such as a real estate brokers association.46  
Alternatively, disparate impact discrimination provides protection for 
those harmed by a facially neutral policy or practice that has a 
discriminatory effect.47 There are two instances typically suited for 
disparate impact liability: (1) where a decision has a “greater adverse 
impact on one racial group than on another”48 and (2) where a decision 
“perpetuates segregation and thereby prevents interracial association.”49   
Unlike disparate treatment, disparate impact liability has not always 
been universally recognized. However, by 2013, twelve federal circuit 
courts recognized disparate impact liability, but differed in their analysis 
of the issue.50 HUD formalized disparate impact liability with a 2013 rule, 
in line with their “long-held interpretation” of the theory.51 Not only did 
the new regulation formally acknowledge the availability of disparate 
impact liability, but it also set forth a uniform standard for evaluating 
disparate impact claims.52 The rule sets forth a three step burden shifting 
framework, requiring the following: (1) claimant must make their prima 
facie case by “proving that a challenged practice caused or predictably 
 
 43. Discriminatory Conduct Under the Fair Housing Act, 24 C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (LEXIS through 
Sep. 16, 2019). 
 44. 24 C.F.R. § 100.85(c) (LEXIS 2019) (Such prohibited actions include engaging in profit-
motivated conduct which: “… conveys to a person that a neighborhood is undergoing or is about to 
undergo a change [regarding a protected class] in order to encourage the person to offer a dwelling for 
sale or rental [or] (2) [e]ncouraging, for profit, any person to sell or rent a dwelling through assertions that 
the entry or prospective entry of persons of [a protected class], can or will result in undesirable 
consequences for the project, neighborhood or community.”). 
 45. 24 C.F.R. § 100.70 (LEXIS 2019) (defined as, “to restrict or attempt to restrict the choices of 
a person by word or conduct in connection with seeking, negotiating for, buying or renting a dwelling so 
as to perpetuate, or tend to perpetuate, segregated housing patterns, or to discourage or obstruct choices 
in a community, neighborhood or development.”). 
 46. 24 C.F.R. § 100.90 (LEXIS 2019). 
 47. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (LEXIS 2019). 
 48. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 F.2d 1283, 1290 (7th Cir. 
1977). 
 49. Id.; see also Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1972) 
(recognizing “the loss of important benefits from interracial associations” impacting “the whole 
community,” not just excluded tenants, as a cognizable injury under the Act). 
 50. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. 
11460 (Feb. 15, 2013).  
 51. Id.  
 52. Id. 
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will cause a discriminatory effect,”53 (2) if claimant satisfies its burden, 
respondent must prove “the challenged practice is necessary to achieve 
one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests,”54 (3) if 
satisfied, claimant can still prevail if able to “prov[e] that the substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests supporting the challenged practice 
could be served by another practice that has a less discriminatory 
effect.”55 The framework specifically noted that any of the defendant’s 
justifications must “be supported by evidence and may not be 
hypothetical or speculative.”56 While the regulation went a long way 
towards the standardization of disparate impact liability, the Supreme 
Court, just 23 months later in Inclusive Communities, neglected to 
expressly adopt the framework and in so doing, limited its bite.57 
C. Texas Department of Housing & Community Affairs v. Inclusive 
Communities Project 
1. Structural Disagreement in the Lower Courts 
While HUD’s recognition of disparate impact liability was a positive 
step forward for those suffering at the hands of discriminatory housing 
practices, the Supreme Court’s decision in Inclusive Communities limited 
its reach.58 This case considered whether the Texas Department of 
Housing & Community Affairs (“Department”) violated the FHA when 
it disproportionately allocated low-income housing tax credits (“LIHTC”)  
to predominantly low-income, African-American neighborhoods. The 
plaintiff in the case, the Inclusive Communities Project (“ICP”), alleged 
that the state’s LIHTC allocation “has caused continued segregated 
housing patterns” and demanded the Department change its selection 
criteria59 in order to promote low-income housing in more affluent 
suburban areas.60 ICP was armed with compelling data to illustrate the 
 
 53. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (LEXIS 2019). 
 54. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019). 
 55. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(3) (LEXIS 2019). But see Am. Ins. Assoc. v. Dept of Hous. and Urban 
Dev., 74 F. Supp. 3d 30, 47 (Dist. D.C. 2014) (holding HUD overstepped its authority to promulgate 
disparate impact regulation and declaring 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 “vacated”), vacated per curiam, No. 14-
5321, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 16894 (D.C. Cir. Sep. 23, 2015). 
 56. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(b)(ii)(2) (LEXIS 16, 2019). 
 57. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2513 
(2015). 
 58. Id.  
 59. Applications for LIHTC credits were scored on a point system, including statutory metrics 
such as   financial feasibility and income level of tenants, in addition to criteria such as the quality of the 
surrounding schools. Id. 
 60. Id. at 2514. 
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disparity, satisfying their burden for a prima facie case according to the 
district court and ultimately prevailing when the Department failed to 
prove “that there [we]re no less discriminatory alternatives” to  meet their 
stated objective.61 On appeal, the Fifth Circuit reversed. Although the 
Fifth Circuit agreed with the consensus that disparate impact claims 
should be recognized, it took issue with the district court’s burden shifting 
framework and the absence of any causation analysis beyond the ICP’s 
“bare statistical evidence.”62 
2. The Supreme Court’s Recognition (and Limitation) of Disparate 
Impact 
The Supreme Court, in a narrow 5-4 decision, affirmed the decision of 
the Fifth Circuit in regards to the availability of disparate impact claims, 
holding them to be “consistent with the Act’s central purpose.” The Court 
specifically pointed to discriminatory land use practices as a prime 
example of disparate impact discrimination, but remanded the case63 to 
be considered in light of several limitations outlined in the majority 
opinion.64 The Court argued that the Act has “always been properly 
limited in key respects that avoid the serious constitutional questions that 
might arise under the [Act].”65 First, a claimant’s prima facie case must 
be subjected to a “robust causality requirement,” pointing to the specific 
policy or policies at issue creating the disparity.66 These limitations serve 
to protect developers and housing authorities from being “held liable for 
racial disparities they did not create.”67 The Court buttressed this 
limitation by pointing to its fear that organizations would resort to the use 
of numerical quotas to ensure racial balance68 and cautioned courts that a 
broad disparate impact liability could “inject racial considerations into 
 
 61. Id. (Over 90% of LIHTC units in Dallas were in areas with less than 50% white residents. ICP 
also argued from 1999-2008 the Department approved LIHTC applications for almost half (49.7%) of 
units proposed in areas comprised of less than 10% white residents, while only approving 37.4% in areas 
with over 90% white residents.). 
 62. Id. at 2515. 
 63. On remand, the district court held that ICP “failed to prove a prima facie case of 
discrimination.” Inclusive Cmtys. Project, Inc. v. Tex. Dep't of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, No. 3:08-CV-
0546-D, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114562, at *42-43 (N.D. Tex. 2016). 
 64. Tex Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty, Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522-523 
(2015). 
 65. Id. at 2522. 
 66. The Court noted that a “one-time decision may not be a policy at all.” id. at 2523; but see 
Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 619 (2nd Cir. 2016) (holding a zoning decision for a 
single parcel of land constituted a “general policy”). 
 67. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 68. Id.  
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every housing decision.”69   
Second, defendants must be given “leeway”70 to prove the practice is 
“necessary to achieve a valid interest.”71 In support of this limit, the Court 
argued that it would be inconsistent with the goal of the Act to “impose 
onerous costs” on well-intentioned developers.72 The Court offered 
further reassurance to developers, noting the Act does not put them “in a 
double bind of liability” based on where they choose to develop.73 The 
Court also noted the complex, and often subjective, decisions that zoning 
officials must make when confronting issues such as historic 
preservation.74 Third, the Court instructed courts that all remedial 
measures in disparate impact cases should be strictly race-neutral.75  
D. Inclusive Communities: Varied Application, Varied Results 
It did not take long for courts across the country to apply their version 
of the Inclusive Communities approach to disparate impact claims. This 
section highlights the varied applications of Inclusive Communities which 
has led to mixed results and relative confusion. First, Sections 1, 2, and 3 
present three divergent applications of the “robust causality” requirement. 
Next, Section 4 examines the application of the final step of the burden 
shifting framework—the plaintiff’s showing of a less discriminatory 
alternative. Then, Section 5 covers the hostility towards single-family 
zoning that has remained in disparate impact liability. Finally, Section 6 
highlights HUD’s proposed framework changes published in August 
2019. 
1. A prima facie case plus proximate cause 
The Eleventh Circuit interpreted robust causality as a general limiting 
factor on disparate impact claims, aiming to guard developers and cities 
from becoming “overburden[ed].”76 In Oviedo Town Center v. City of 
Oviedo, the court held that increases in utility rates in low-income rental 
housing did not “establish a disparate impact, let alone any causal 
 
 69. Id. at 2524; The Court’s cautious majority opinion goes on to say that a broad disparate impact 
liability would, not only undermine the Act, but would undermine the “free-market system.” Id.  
 70. Id. at 2522. 
 71. Id. at 2523. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Id. Meaning developers would be “subject to suit whether they choose to rejuvenate a city core 
or to promote new low-income housing in suburban communities.” Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 2524.  
 76. Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App'x 828, 834 (11th Cir. 2018). 
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connection between the [rate increases] and the disparate impact.”77 The 
court rejected the plaintiff’s offer of statistical evidence as, “nothing more 
than a showing that a policy impacted more members of a protected class 
than non-members of protected classes.”78 This is generally aligned with 
the guidance in Inclusive Communities that courts should “avoid 
interpreting disparate-impact liability to be so expansive as to inject racial 
considerations into every housing decision.”79 However, this requirement 
operates much more strictly in practice when an additional showing of 
proximate cause is required.80  
2. Robust causality as proven by statistical evidence 
The Fourth Circuit focused on the presence of statistical evidence that 
led to a direct and cognizable consequence. In de Reyes v. Waples Mobile 
Home Park, a mobile home park began enforcing a policy requiring all 
residents to provide citizenship documentation—a policy that previously 
went unenforced and only applied to individuals named on the lease.81 
The enforcement of the policy was shown to adversely impact Latinx 
residents in the mobile home park, such that they were ten times more 
likely to be negatively impacted.82 The court suggested that while it is 
imperative for the plaintiff to prove the disparity “is the result of one or 
more of the [] practices that they are attacking,” evident statistical 
disparities can ease the causation burden.83 
3. Arbitrary and Unnecessary Requirement 
The Eighth Circuit added an additional requirement to the already 
burdensome prima facie case standard: requiring the plaintiff to allege 
 
 77. Id. at 835. 
 78. Id. at 834; see also de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park L.P., 903 F.3d 415, 434 (4th Cir. 
2018) (Keenan, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that “geographical happenstance cannot give rise to liability 
against an entity not responsible for the geographical distribution.”). 
 79. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2524; See also Wards Cove Packing Co. v. 
Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 653 (1989) (arguing that disparate impact claims in workplace supported by only 
bare statistical evidence of racial disparities would lead to troubling use of quota system in the workplace). 
 80. Oviedo Town Ctr., 759 F. App'x at 836 (noting that even if a prime facie case had been 
presented “we would then proceed to consider the causal relation.”) (emphasis added). 
 81. de Reyes, 903 F.3d at 419. 
 82. Id. at 428 (“Latinos constitute 64.6% of the total undocumented immigrant population in 
Virginia, … are ten times more likely than non-Latinos to be adversely affected by the Policy, as 
undocumented immigrants constitute 36.4% of the Latino population compared with only 3.6% of the 
non-Latino population.”); see also Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co. 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th 
Cir 2019) (focusing on the behavior change in the 4th Circuit’s robust causation analysis). 
 83. de Reyes, 903 F.3d at 425, 428 (noting that statistical evidence demonstrating the result of the 
park’s documentation requirement satisfied prima facie standard). 
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facts demonstrating the policy at issue is “arbitrary or unnecessary.”84 In 
Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, the court rejected a plaintiff’s claim that a 
city housing code aimed to discourage for-profit rental housing.85 Here, 
plaintiffs alleged the city’s vague housing code and rental license 
revocations displaced “protected class families” from their rental units.86 
The court rejected the plaintiff’s claim, specifically pointing to the lack 
of  “factually supported allegations that [the] provisions are arbitrary or 
unnecessary to health and safety.”87 The Eighth Circuit’s prima facie 
standard is particularly burdensome in this way; requiring not only robust 
causality, but a showing that the challenged practice is arbitrary and 
unnecessary. 
4. Less Discriminatory Alternatives  
The interests of the defendants, typically developers and 
municipalities, are closely guarded in the third step of the burden shifting 
framework as well. If defendants carry their burden of proving the 
challenged practice is necessary to achieve their stated interest, the 
plaintiff can still prevail if they offer “an available alternative … practice 
that has less disparate impact and serves the [entity’s] legitimate needs.”88 
This standard operates as a relatively tough bar for plaintiffs to meet. For 
instance, in Inclusive Communities Project v. Lincoln Property Company, 
the Fifth Circuit rejected a plaintiff’s showing of less discriminatory 
alternatives to the defendant’s practice of refusing to accept tenants 
paying with Section 8 vouchers.89 The court noted that the plaintiff failed 
to demonstrate how the alternative programs would be managed or if the 
plaintiff could financially support them.90 However, in Mhany 
Management v. County of Nassau, a plaintiff’s showing that an alternative 
zoning code would serve the city’s interests in traffic reduction below 
current levels, satisfied the burden even though the city’s proposed zoning 
code would have actually reduced traffic more effectively.91 
 
 84. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 85. Id. at 1112. 
 86. Id. at 1109. 
 87. Id. at 1112. 
 88. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2518 (2015) 
(alterations in original); see also 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c)(3) (LEXIS through Sep. 16, 2019 issue). 
 89. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir. 2019). 
 90. Id. (“[I]f ICP's programs were not successfully executed, Lincoln and the Owners ‘could 
experience financial harm.’”).  
 91. Mhany Mgmt. v. Cty. of Nassau, No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *37 
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 2017).  
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5. A hostility towards single-family zoning remains prevalent 
Despite the warning from Inclusive Communities that a decision to 
build on a single site, as opposed to a citywide scheme, “may not be a 
policy at all," courts generally accept a single instance of restrictive land 
use policy as sufficient to form the basis of a prima facie case of disparate 
impact.92 For instance, the Second Circuit expressed a strong opposition 
to restrictive land use policies, like single-family zoning, in Mhany 
Management. v. County. of Nassau, even when the zoning decision only 
affected a single site.93 In Mhany, after residents of a town with no 
affordable housing94 voiced strong opposition to the prospect of multi-
family development on the site, the city developed a new zoning code that 
effectively eliminated the possibility of multi-family development on the 
parcel.95 The court pointed to the specific identification of restrictive 
zoning by Inclusive Communities as evidence that even if a single 
decision rather than a widespread policy was at issue, such restrictions 
“function unfairly to exclude minorities from certain neighborhoods 
without any sufficient justification" and are "at the heartland of disparate-
impact liability.”96 Other federal circuit courts have also required a higher 
showing of disparate impact by plaintiffs for “affirmative … obligations 
on private actors,” such as changing a voucher-acceptance policy, while 
removing barriers like restrictive zoning are treated more favorably for 
plaintiffs.97 
6. Recent interpretations by HUD threaten to obliterate disparate impact 
In a continued effort to strip down disparate impact liability, the Trump 
administration, through HUD, proposed regulations in August 2019 that, 
if adopted, would combine many of the above restrictions into a new, five-
 
 92. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523-524.  
 93. Mhany Mgmt., 819 F.3d at 619. 
 94. Id. at 587.  In this case, affordable housing meant “housing which requires no more than 30% 
of a household's income for households earning 80% or less of the Area Median Income for the Nassau-
Suffolk Metropolitan Statistical Area.” Id. at n.1. 
 95. Id. at 596. 
 96. Id. at 619 (quoting Tex Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty, Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. 
Ct. 2507, 2522 (2015)); see also Huntington v. Huntington Branch, NAACP, 488 U.S. 15, 17 (1988) 
(holding single-family zoning has a discriminatory impact because it “restricts private construction of 
low-income housing to the largely minority urban renewal area, which ‘significantly perpetuated 
segregation’”); United States v. City of Black Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1186 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding that the 
“ultimate effect” and the “historical context” of single-family zoning were discriminatory). But see 
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hou. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 (1976) (holding that plaintiff 
failed to prove discriminatory purpose was a motivating factor in request to rezone area for multi-family 
housing). 
 97. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890, 908 (5th Cir. 2019). 
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part burden on the plaintiff.98 Under this approach, a plaintiff would be 
required to prove: (1) the practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and 
unnecessary to achieve a valid interest or legitimate objective;” (2) a 
“robust causal link;” (3) “that the challenged policy or practice has an 
adverse effect on members of a protected class;” (4) that the disparity is 
“significant;” (5) that the “complaining party’s alleged injury is directly 
caused” by the practice.99 Notably, the proposed framework eliminates a 
respondent’s burden of identifying a valid interest served by the policy 
unless the plaintiff proves that practice is “arbitrary, artificial, and 
unnecessary.”100 HUD then offers several possible defenses for 
respondents including claims of limited discretion,101 challenges to robust 
causality,102 and several types of challenges to the plaintiff’s statistical 
models.103 
III. DISCUSSION 
It is wrong to limit disparate impact liability under the FHA. Moreover, 
federal courts are largely setting standards that are too onerous to meet 
outside of very specific scenarios with clear causation—a situation 
inconsistent with disparate impact liability as a whole. Section A of this 
Part argues that the Supreme Court’s opinion in Inclusive Communities 
places too many limits on an already restrictive theory. Section B analyzes 
the flawed application of the standard in federal courts across the country, 
focusing on the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits. Section C then analyzes the 
common-sense workability of the Fourth and Second Circuit’s application 
of the standard. Finally, Section D proposes an alternative framework that 
stays true to the stated purpose of the Act, while also accounting for the 
Supreme Court’s safeguards identified in Inclusive Communities. 
 
 98. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42, 
854 (proposed Aug, 9, 2019) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R 100). https://s3.amazonaws.com/public-
inspection.federalregister.gov/2019-17542.pdf [https://perma.cc/94GK-UNCX]; see also Lola Fadula, 
Trump Proposal Would Raise Bar for Proving Housing Discrimination, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 2, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/02/us/politics/trump-housing-discrimination.html 
[https://perma.cc/9KGF-EAW6]. 
 99. HUD’s Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Disparate Impact Standard, 84 Fed. Reg. 42, 
854, 15-17. 
 100. Id. at 16 (“If a plaintiff adequately alleges facts to support the assertion that the practice or 
policy is arbitrary, artificial, and unnecessary, only then does the defendant have the burden to identify a 
valid interest or interests that the challenged policy or practice serves.”). 
 101. Id. at 18 (“Paragraph (c)(1) provides that the defendant may show its discretion is materially 
limited by a third party.”). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 19. 
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A. The Supreme Court overly constrained disparate impact liability in 
Inclusive Communities 
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Inclusive Communities is overly 
restrictive and has directly caused the atrophy of disparate impact 
liability104 in courts across the country in the following ways: (1) the 
robust causality requirement of a plaintiff’s prima facie case is too 
demanding in a typical disparate impact situation and (2) the defendant’s 
burden of proof is far too minimal to have any real bite. 
First, robust causality provides too much focus on proximate cause 
when the entire aim of disparate impact is to provide an avenue for relief 
when intent cannot be proved by an injured party.105 HUD’s 2013 
regulations admittedly do not provide much guidance in this regard, but 
Inclusive Communities goes too far in its application and requirement of 
“robust causality.” While the HUD regulations require proof of a 
discriminatory effect, plaintiffs are able to prove that a practice “caused 
or predictably will cause” the effect.106 Though it is necessary to identify 
the practice at issue, imposing an onerous causation requirement as the 
Court did in Inclusive Communities undercuts the purpose of disparate 
impact—finding relief from discrimination when overt intent is difficult 
to prove.107  
Next, the defendant’s burden of proof is far too low to apply without 
dismantling disparate impact altogether. HUD’s 2013 regulations 
formalized the second step of the burden shifting framework and required 
the defendant to prove that “the challenged practice is necessary to 
achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, nondiscriminatory 
interests.”108 The Inclusive Communities decision, on the other hand, 
allows a policy to stand if the defendant can prove, with so-called 
“leeway,” the policy “is necessary to achieve a valid interest.”109 The 
Court makes a comparison to workplace requirements, noting that a 
 
 104. Disparate impact liability was already extremely limited in practice, having been successful 
for plaintiffs merely 18 times between 1974-2013 (19.6% of cases). Stacy E. Seichnaydre, Is Disparate 
Impact Having an Impact? An Appellate Analysis of Forty Years of Disparate Impact Claims Under the 
Fair Housing Act, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 357, 399 (2013).  
 105. “Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act based on a practice's discriminatory 
effect, as defined in paragraph (a) of this section, even if the practice was not motivated by a 
discriminatory intent.” 24 C.F.R. § 100. 500 (LEXIS 2019). 
 106. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(1) (LEXIS 2019) (emphasis added). 
 107. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500 (LEXIS 2019) (“Liability may be established under the Fair Housing Act 
based on a practice's discriminatory effect … even if the practice was not motivated by a discriminatory 
intent.”). 
 108. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019) (emphasis added). 
 109. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522-23 
(2015) (emphasis added); id. at 2524 (noting without these “safeguards … valid governmental and private 
priorities” might be displaced) (emphasis added). 
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policy causing a disparate impact can stand if it is a “reasonable 
measure[ment] of job performance,” before concluding that although not 
an exact fit, “the comparison suffices.”110 This culminates in a drastic 
reduction of the defendant’s burden—not only a far cry from the aims of 
the Act,111 but entirely inconsistent with HUD’s regulations just two years 
prior.112 Moreover, the Court notes concerns facing municipalities when 
making complex zoning decisions and the purported “double bind of 
liability” that arises when making a decision that impacts a “community’s 
quality of life,” while entirely failing to consider the quality of life issues 
faced by the injured parties in these cases.113 
The Court remains silent on the final step of HUD’s framework 
regarding the plaintiff’s proof of nondiscriminatory alternative practices. 
However, the defendant’s standard is so minimal that virtually any 
justification allows policies having a disparate impact to stand. Given the 
lack of limitations placed on this final step, some lower courts have taken 
advantage to allow some disparate impact claims to survive.114  
The Court’s opinion is also internally inconsistent, applying these 
restrictive standards just pages after formally recognizing disparate 
impact claims as part of the Act and noting that “zoning laws and other 
housing restrictions that function unfairly to exclude minorities from 
certain neighborhoods … reside at the heartland of disparate-impact 
liability.”115 The Court mentions developers and tenants alike have found, 
and should continue to find, relief under the disparate impact theory, but 
quickly “limit[s] [the Act] in key respects.”116 
B. The inequitable application of a flawed standard in federal circuit 
courts 
Circuit courts have taken the guidance provided in Inclusive 
Communities as credence to promote further inequity. First, Section 1 
argues that the Eleventh Circuit’s addition of proximate cause to the prima 
face case is unworkable. Next, Section 2 argues the burden of proving the 
necessity of a practice should fall on the defendant. 
 
 110. Id. at 2523. 
 111. See supra Section II.B.1. 
 112. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 113. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 114. See supra Section II.D.4. 
 115. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2521-22 (emphasis added). 
 116. Id. at 2522 (emphasis added). 
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1. Robust causality does not include an independent finding of 
proximate cause 
The Eleventh Circuit’s focus on proximate caused created an 
unworkable standard in Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo.117 
Here, a developer claimed a city’s utility rate increase disproportionately 
impacted minority residents.118 The Eleventh Circuit disagreed, affirming 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the city and 
dismissing the disparate impact claim.119 The court establishes the 
proximate cause requirement as a separate step in and of itself, apparently 
trying to align itself with its interpretation of Inclusive Communities.120 
While Inclusive Communities mandates a causal connection, the Court is 
clear in its acceptance of statistical evidence as demonstrating that 
connection.121 Admittedly, the plaintiff’s statistical evidence in support of 
its prima facie case was weak in this case.122 However, the court notes 
that even with strong statistical evidence it would then proceed to 
proximate cause considerations.123 This additional level of scrutiny on a 
plaintiff’s claim entirely conflates the Court’s guidance in Inclusive 
Communities as well as the relevant HUD regulations.124 
2. A prima facie case does not require a showing that the practice was 
arbitrary and unnecessary 
The Eighth Circuit’s rejection of a prima facie case based on the 
plaintiff’s failure to prove the practice was “arbitrary and unnecessary” 
placed an unnecessary burden on the plaintiff— making the standard 
nearly unreachable.125 While Inclusive Communities heightened the 
standard for “robust causality,” the Court does not demand a plaintiff 
demonstrate the challenged practice is arbitrary or unnecessary.126 The 
Inclusive Communities Court does include this language, noting that 
 
 117. Oviedo Town Ctr. II, L.L.L.P. v. City of Oviedo, 759 F. App'x 828 (11th Cir. 2018). 
 118. Id. at 830. 
 119. Id. at 839. 
 120. Id. at 836.  
 121. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 ("[a] plaintiff who fails to allege facts 
at the pleading stage or produce statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection cannot make out 
a prima facie case of disparate impact.") (emphasis added). 
 122. Oviedo Town Ctr., 759 F. App'x at 833, 835 (appellants presented only the results of a self-
reported survey that only demonstrated that more minority residents lived in complex compared to the 
rest of the City). 
 123. Id. at 836 (noting “a prima facie case of disparate impact might have been presented, and we 
would then proceed to consider the causal relation”). 
 124. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 125. Ellis v. City of Minneapolis, 860 F.3d 1106, 1112 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 126. See supra Section II.C.2. 
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“policies are not contrary to the disparate-impact requirement unless they 
are ‘artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers.’”127 However, this is 
not a burden intended for the plaintiff. Rather, it is a clear reference to the 
defendant’s required showing that the policy is “necessary to achieve a 
valid interest.”128 It would be entirely redundant for the Court to have 
required a necessity showing by both parties. The Eighth Circuit’s 
approach would dictate for the following burden shifting framework: (1) 
plaintiff makes a prima facie case, demonstrating robust causality and that 
the challenged practice is arbitrary and unnecessary,129 (2) defendant, 
with so-called “leeway,” explains how the challenged practice is 
necessary to achieve a valid interest, (3) plaintiff demonstrates a less 
discriminatory alternative that would serve defendant’s interest.130 This is 
fundamentally at odds with the guidance in Inclusive Communities and 
HUD regulations which clearly shoulder the defendant with the burden to 
prove the practice is necessary—not the reverse.131  
C. The equitable application of a flawed standard in federal circuit 
courts 
Despite some federal courts weakening disparate impact liability, 
others have used Inclusive Communities disparate impact theory to 
promote equity. First, Section 1 argues the Fourth Circuit’s use of 
statistics is true to the aims of the Act. Next, Section 2 argues for a 
plaintiff-friendly standard for proof of less discriminatory alternatives. 
1. Compelling statistical evidence can satisfy robust causality  
The Fourth Circuit’s acceptance of, and focus on, statistics has allowed 
disparate impact liability under Inclusive Communities to serve its true 
purpose. Here, the court was confronted with the discriminatory 
enforcement of a rule at a mobile home park requiring all residents in the 
park to provide documentation proving their legal status in the U.S.132 The 
court accepted the statistical evidence133 as  “self-evident” of  a prima 
 
 127. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2524 (quoting Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 
401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971)) (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. at 2523. 
 129. Ellis, 860 F.3d at 1112. 
 130. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2522. 
 131. See 24 C.F.R. 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019) (“Once the charging party or plaintiff satisfies the 
burden of proof set forth in paragraph (c)(1) of this section, the respondent or defendant has the burden of 
proving that the challenged practice is necessary to achieve one or more substantial, legitimate, 
nondiscriminatory interests of the respondent or defendant.”) (emphasis added). 
 132. de Reyes v. Waples Mobile Home Park L.P., 903 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 133. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
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facie disparate impact claim,134 not requiring a close examination of 
causation although it was abundantly clear in this case.135 To be sure, 
causation is still a necessary component of disparate impact claims. For 
instance, the Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities demands that the 
claim must fail if  “the plaintiff cannot point to [the] defendant’s policy 
or policies causing that disparity.”136 However, the Court also stated that 
statistical evidence can demonstrate that causal connection, noting a 
plaintiff is required to “allege facts at the pleading stage or produce 
statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection.”137 The additional 
step of proximate cause is wholly unnecessary, as demonstrated by 
Inclusive Communities’ acceptance of compelling statistics. 
2. Less discriminatory alternatives need not be equally effective 
The Mhany court’s common-sense approach to the reasonable 
alternatives prong of the framework is true to the aim of the Act and to 
the Court’s rationale in Inclusive Communities.138 In Mhany, a city’s 
rezoning of a single parcel to eliminate the possibility of affordable 
housing was held to have a discriminatory effect on minorities.139 On 
remand, defendants argued that the plaintiffs must prove that their 
proposed alternative would be “equally effective” as their rezoning 
strategy.140 The Eastern District of New York disagreed and determined 
that the plaintiff’s proposed alternative would only need to “serve[] [the 
city’s] interests.”141 Not only is the court’s express rejection of the 
“equally effective” standard in line with the stated purpose of the Act, but 
it is directly in line with HUD’s interpretation of the burden shifting 
 
 134. de Reyes, 903 F.3d at 428 (quoting Betsey v. Turtle Creek Associates 736 F.2d 983, 988 (4th 
Cir. 1984)). 
 135. The policy had historically had only been enforced against the leaseholder, but in mid-2015, 
the park began requiring documentation from adult occupant. Id. at 419. 
 136. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2523 
(2015). 
 137. Id. 
 138. Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 618 (2nd Cir. 2016). 
 139. Id. at 619-20; remanded to No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *38 (E.D.N.Y. 
Sep. 19, 2017) (holding plaintiff’s burden to prove alternative, nondiscriminatory methods of satisfying 
defendant’s interests was satisfied and zoning scheme thus had a disparate impact). 
 140. Mhany Mgmt., No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 
2017). 
 141. Id. at *26; See Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 
Fed. Reg. 11460, 11473 (February 15, 2013) (“The additional modifier "equally effective," borrowed from 
the superseded Wards Cove case, is even less appropriate in the housing context than in the employment 
area in light of the wider range and variety of practices covered by the Act that are not readily 
quantifiable.”). But see Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co. 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir 2019) 
(rejecting plaintiff’s showing of less discriminatory alternatives due to financial harm that could be 
suffered by defendants).  
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framework, noting that  it is consistent “with the Joint Policy Statement, 
with Congress's codification of the disparate impact standard in the 
employment context, and with judicial interpretations of the Fair Housing 
Act.”142 Further still, HUD notes that the “equally effective” standard 
would be difficult to apply in Fair Housing Act cases, given the challenges 
that come along with quantifying many housing practices.143 
D. A burden-shifting framework to eliminate exclusionary zoning and 
promote equity 
This proposed burden shifting framework protects the interests of both 
parties and honors the constitutional concerns raised in Inclusive 
Communities, while fulfilling the stated purpose of the Fair Housing Act. 
Used effectively, the framework could eliminate single-family zoning—
a practice the Supreme Court has identified as “resid[ing] at the heartland 
of disparate-impact liability”144 and would promote “integrated and 
balanced living patterns.”145  
1. A realistic robust causality anchored on statistical evidence 
The proposed framework closely follows the current HUD regulations, 
while respecting the concerns of the Supreme Court in Inclusive 
Communities.  First, the plaintiff must present a claim supported by 
statistical evidence demonstrating a causal connection. At this stage, 
causation should, more often than not, be “self-evident,” assuming the 
statistical evidence raises an inference of causation. This step leans 
heavily on the guidance of Inclusive Communities, while channeling the 
Fourth Circuit’s interpretation of “robust causality,” which allows for 
reliance on statistical evidence. While the Supreme Court in Inclusive 
Communities was concerned with an overreliance on statistical evidence, 
this formulation of the step allows plaintiffs with compelling statistics to 
make a prima facie case. However, a claim supported only by statistics 
without an inference of causation can and should be rejected.146  
 
 142. “HUD does not believe the rule's language needs to be further revised to state that the less 
discriminatory alternative must be ‘equally effective,’ or ‘at least as effective,’ in serving the respondent's 
or defendant's interests.” 
Implementation of the Fair Housing Act's Discriminatory Effects Standard, 78 Fed. Reg. at 11473. 
 143. Id. 
 144. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs v. Inclusive Cmtys. Project, 135 S. Ct. 2507, 2522 
(2015). 
 145. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
 146. “But disparate-impact liability has always been properly limited in key respects to avoid 
serious constitutional questions that might arise under the FHA, e.g., if such liability were imposed based 
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2. A heightened standard of justification for defendants harkens back to 
HUD’s regulations 
Once this burden is satisfied, a respondent must then demonstrate (a) 
that the challenged practice is “necessary to achieve one or more 
substantial, legitimate [and] nondiscriminatory interests”147 and (b) that 
the challenged practice is not the primary factor furthering the alleged 
disparate impact. This step expressly rejects the Supreme Court’s 
approach and reverts to the prior HUD language, rather than the low 
standard used in Inclusive Communities.148 The step also requires 
respondents to demonstrate that the practice is not the primary factor 
causing the disparate impact. The reason for both of these changes is 
simple: the Fair Housing Act demands it. To allow for the Supreme 
Court’s low standard for a respondent’s justification would permit 
discrimination if merely “necessary to achieve a valid interest.”149 Surely, 
an Act that allows discrimination in furtherance of decreased traffic150 
would not “provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing 
throughout the United States.”151 Moreover, the added “primary factor” 
requirement is also furthering the Act’s objectives. If the Act is to strive 
for “truly integrated and balanced living patterns,”152 it must also reject a 
policy, even if achieving a valid interest, if it is a primary cause of 
furthering the demonstrated discrimination. To do otherwise would be to 
ignore the nation’s “historic commitment to creating an integrated 
society.”153  
3. The final offer of a less discriminatory alternative should be 
reasonable 
Next, if this burden is carried by the defendant, the plaintiff must then 
show either: (a) the respondent’s interest is not “substantial, legitimate, 
[and] nondiscriminatory” or (b) the plaintiff’s stated interest could be 
achieved by an alternative practice that would have a less discriminatory 
effect, even if not as effective as the challenged practice. This final step 
 
solely on a showing of a statistical disparity.” Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2512 
(emphasis added).  
 147. 24 C.F.R. § 100.500(c)(2) (LEXIS 2019). 
 148. Id. (defendant must prove the practice is “necessary to achieve one or more substantial, 
legitimate, nondiscriminatory interests”). But see Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 
(noting that defendants will be allowed to maintain a policy if it is “necessary to achieve a valid interest”). 
 149. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523. 
 150. Mhany Mgmt. v. Cnty. of Nassau, 819 F.3d 581, 620 (2nd Cir. 2016) (accepting defendant’s 
stated interest of traffic control as legitimate governmental interest to restrict multi-family development). 
 151. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (LEXIS through Pub. L. No. 116-91). 
 152. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
 153. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525. 
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combines the guidance of HUD, as applied by the Eastern District of New 
York, insofar as the alternative practice need not be “equally effective,” 
but must merely meet the interest.154 While the burden falls on the 
plaintiff at this point, the responsibility to meet a stated interest in a less 
discriminatory manner should, in practice, lie with the respondent as they 
are typically the party with expertise in the given field. For instance, the 
Fifth Circuit’s application of this step rejected the plaintiff’s proposed 
alternatives because the respondents could be financially harmed.155 
While financial viability must be considered, surely it cannot be the lead 
factor in a rejection of a less discriminatory alternative. Moreover, under 
this integrated analysis, a reduction in profit would not necessarily render 
the alternative invalid, as long as the respondent’s interest was achieved. 
4. Exclusionary zoning practices should be reviewed with greater 
scrutiny 
Moreover, courts should examine instances of exclusionary zoning 
with a greater level of scrutiny. First, courts have historically applied a 
lower standard of review towards the removal of barriers, such as 
eliminating single-family zoning, as opposed to commanding action, such 
as forcing landlords to accept housing vouchers.156 Next, the United 
States Congress and the Supreme Court have both acknowledged and 
taken steps to eliminate similar segregation. The Fair Housing Act was 
expressly enacted to eliminate segregation as demonstrated by Senator 
Mondale’s plea to replace the ghettos with “truly integrated and balanced 
living patterns.”157 The Supreme Court in Inclusive Communities 
recognizes the “historic commitment to creating an integrated society.”158 
The Court has even recognized the detrimental impacts single-family 
zoning can have on everyone—beyond those who are actually being 
excluded, noting parties who may not have even been excluded can bring 
 
 154. Mhany Mgmt., No. 05-cv-2301, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 153214, at *26 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 19, 
2017). 
 155. Inclusive Cmtys. Project v. Lincoln Prop. Co., 920 F.3d 890, 906 (5th Cir 2019). 
 156. Id. at 908-909; see also Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp. v. Village of Arlington Heights, 558 
F.2d 1283, 1293 (7th Cir. 1977) (“The courts ought to be more reluctant to grant relief when the plaintiff 
seeks to compel the defendant to construct integrated housing or take affirmative steps to ensure that 
integrated housing is built than when the plaintiff is attempting to build integrated housing on his own 
land and merely seeks to enjoin the defendant from interfering with that construction”); Huntington 
Branch, NAACP v. Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 936 (1988) (noting that in a disparate impact claim seeking 
compelled action, “a defendant would normally have to establish a somewhat more substantial 
justification for its adverse action than would be required if the defendant were defending its decision not 
to build.”); Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d at 908 (distinguishing between compelled action and removal 
of arbitrary barriers). 
 157. 114 CONG. REC. 3422 (daily ed. Feb. 20, 1968) (statement of Sen. Mondale). 
 158. Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2525. 
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a disparate impact claim based on a “loss of important benefits from 
interracial associations.”159  
IV. CONCLUSION 
Disparate impact liability under the Fair Housing Act is a vital 
protection against covert and systemic racism. While the Supreme Court 
solidified its existence in Inclusive Communities, subsequent courts, 
including the Eleventh, Eighth, and Fifth Circuits have demonstrated the 
flawed analysis that can result when applying the Inclusive Communities 
framework, particularly in their understanding of robust causality and less 
discriminatory alternatives. Others, including the Fourth and Second 
Circuits, have aligned themselves closer with the true aims of the Act, 
while still honoring the objectives of Inclusive Communities. 
Without the full protection for the Fair Housing Act’s disparate impact 
liability, “states and others will be left with fewer critical tools to combat 
the kinds of systemic discrimination that the Act was intended to 
address.”160 A full-powered disparate impact liability, as proposed above, 
can and should be implemented. This approach, while in stark contrast to 
the recent regulations proposed by HUD,161 zealously and equitably 
protects those whom the Act was fundamentally intended to protect: the 
nation’s most vulnerable.  
 
 
 159. See Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209-210 (1972) (noting the “broad 
and inclusive” language of the FHA allows parties, injured by the “loss of important benefits from 
interracial associations” to bring a claim); see also Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. at 2523 
(noting zoning decisions “contribute to a community’s quality of life and are legitimate concerns for 
housing authorities”).  
 160. Brief of Mass., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 12, Tex. Dep’t of Hous. & 
Cmty. Affairs, 135 S. Ct. 2507 (2015) (No. 13-1371) (noting that it would be a “significant concern to 
States” to lose disparate impact liability). 
161. See supra Section II.D.6. 
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